Prior research has uncovered a large and positive correlation between education and health. This paper examines whether education has a causal impact on health. I follow synthetic cohorts using successive U.S. censuses to estimate the impact of educational attainment on mortality rates. I use compulsory education laws from 1915 to 1939 as instruments for education. The results suggest that education has a causal impact on mortality, and that this effect is perhaps larger than has been previously estimated in the literature.
INTRODUCTION
Access to healthcare insurance 1 and expenditures on healthcare, 2 have been shown to have little effect on health. On the other hand, there is a large and positive correlation between education and health (Grossman and Kaestner, 1997) . This correlation is strong and significant even after controlling for different measures of socio-economic status, such as income and race, and regardless of how health is measured (morbidity rates, self-reported health status or other measures of health). Given that the measured effects of education are large, investments in education might prove to be a cost-effective means of achieving better health, 3 if education indeed helps us to be healthier. But prior research has not ascertained whether the relationship between education and health is causal.
The purpose of this paper is to determine whether education has a causal effect on health, in particular on mortality. The negative relationship between education and mortality, the most basic measure of health, has become well established since the famous (Kitagawa and Hauser, 1973) study, which found significant differences in mortality rates across educational categories for both sexes. More recent studies (e.g. Christenson and Johnson (1995) , Deaton and Paxson (1999) ) confirm these findings. Elo and Preston (1996) control for a variety of other mortality factors such as income, race, marital status, region of residence, and region of birth. Rogers, Hummer and Nam (2000) further control for access to healthcare, insurance, smoking, exercise, occupation, and other factors. Figures 1 and 2 document this relationship using consecutive census data for the U.S.: in all cohorts, those who survive have higher education than those who do not.
The existing literature has explained this correlation in three ways. One controversial hypothesis is that education increases health, either because education makes people better decision makers (Grossman, 1972a,b) and/or because more educated people have better 1. See Newhouse (1993) . 2. For example, see Filmer and Prichett (1997) . 3. This was first suggested by Auster, Leveson and Sarachek (1969) . 15,000 20,000 25,000 1901 1903 1905 1907 1909 1911 1913 1915 1917 1919 1921 1923 1925 FIGURE 1 Number of observations per cohort 1901 1903 1905 1907 1909 1911 1913 1915 1917 1919 1921 1923 1925 Birth year Figure 1 we can observe that 10-year mortality increases with age: for older cohorts the number of individuals observed in 1980 is much smaller than in 1960 or 1970. In Figure 2 we can see that the average level of education is higher in 1980 than in 1960 for all cohorts, suggesting that those who died in each cohort had below average levels of education.
information about health (Kenkel (1991) , Rosenzweig and Schultz (1991) ). Another possibility is that poor health results in little education (Perri (1984) , Currie and Hyson (1999) ). Finally, this correlation could be caused by a third unobserved variable that affects both education and health, for example, genetic characteristics or parental background. Many studies have attempted to include these factors. 4 However, Fuchs (1982) argued that discount rates (which no study controls for) would also explain the correlation: people who are impatient invest little in education and health, while people who are patient invest a lot in both. 5 Of course, these theories are not necessarily mutually exclusive.
In this paper I address this issue using a unique quasi-natural experiment: between 1915 and 1939, at least 30 states changed their compulsory schooling laws and child labour laws. If compulsory schooling laws forced people to get more schooling than they would have chosen otherwise, and if education increases health, then individuals who spent their teens in states that required them to go to school for more years should be relatively healthier and live longer. The intuition that compulsory education laws provide a natural experiment was put forward first by Angrist and Krueger (1991) . They argued that because compulsory education laws forced individuals to stay in school until a certain age, those born in later quarters would stay in school longer. Although they were criticized for their choice of quarter of birth as an instrument, 6 the underlying principle is appealing and implementable. 7 No other papers have used natural experiments to measure the effect of education on mortality. A few studies (Berger and Leigh (1989) , Sander (1995) , Leigh and Dhir (1997) ) have used instrumental variable (IV) estimation with other measures of health, such as blood pressure, smoking or exercise. 8 But these studies are inconclusive because each paper's choice of instrument is questionable. For example, all of these studies use parents' background/education as instruments, but we know these are correlated with children's health, 9 and furthermore, we know that health shocks during childhood or gestation have persistent health effects into adulthood. 10 Income and education expenditures in state-of-birth could serve as instruments (Berger and Leigh, 1989) , but again they might be correlated with state expenditures on health, state industrial composition and other state characteristics that affect health.
Using the 1960, 1970 and 1980 censuses of the U.S., I select those individuals who were 14 years of age between 1915 and 1939. I then construct synthetic cohorts and follow them over time to calculate their mortality rates. I then match cohorts to the compulsory attendance and child labour laws that were in place in their state-of-birth when they were 14 years old. The census data have not been used to calculate mortality rates before in economic analyses. 11 This method could be used to analyse mortality experiences in periods where no other data are available.
I start by looking at the direct effect of changes in compulsory schooling on the mortality rates of the cohorts immediately preceding and following the change in legislation in a regression discontinuity fashion, taking care to look at states where the changes appear to have been binding for many children. These results suggest that compulsory laws had an effect on adult mortality and are consistent with the hypothesis that education affects health.
Then I look at the effect of these laws on educational attainment and show that one more year of compulsory schooling increased education by 5% of a year. Then several IV estimations of the effect of education on mortality are presented, including an original two-stage procedure for grouped data that can be applied when the first stage can be estimated at the individual level 6 . See Bound, Jaeger and Baker (1995) and Bound and Jaeger (1996) . 7. Harmon and Walker (1995) look at the effects of the laws in the U.K. Meghir and Palme (1999) used Swedish data. Acemoglu and Angrist (1999) used U.S. laws to determine the size of the social returns to education.
8. Berger and Leigh (1989) estimate the effect of education on blood pressure using the NHANES I. They use state-of-birth, income and education expenditures per capita from year-of-birth to age 6 in state-of-birth, and dummies for ancestry as instruments for education. They also estimate the effect of education on disability with NLS data, using IQ and family background measures as instruments. In both cases schooling is significant. Using a sample of older persons from the 1986 PSID, Leigh and Dhir (1997) use parental education, background, and state-of-residence at age 16 to instrument for education in regressions for disability and exercise. Alternatively, they include direct measures of time preferences and risk aversion. Education was not always significant. Finally Sander (1995) examines the effect of schooling on the odds of quitting smoking using the General Social Survey. He uses parental schooling as an instrument for schooling and finds that the effect of schooling is quite large for whites.
9. Development studies show that family background affects children's health (see Strauss and Thomas, 1995) . 10. For examples see studies that looked at the consequences of the Dutch famine on the health of adults conceived during the famine, such as Hoek, Brown and Susser (1998) or Roseboom et al. (2000) .
11. However, this methodology is used in epidemiology. For example, see the work by Haines and Preston (1997) .
but the second stage can only be estimated at the aggregate level. This procedure can easily be applied to other cases as well.
The results provide evidence that suggests there is a causal effect of education on mortality and that this effect is perhaps larger than the previous literature suggests. While GLS estimates suggest that an additional year of education lowers the probability of dying in the next 10 years by approximately 1·3 percentage points, my results from the IV estimation show that the effect is much larger: at least 3·6 percentage points. However, the results also suggest that the OLS and the IV estimates are not statistically different. The direct effect of compulsory schooling on mortality suggests that changes in compulsory schooling affected mortality. Furthermore, these estimates are consistent with the implied IV effects. This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data used in this project, including a description of how the census is used to obtain mortality rates. Section 3 briefly describes compulsory schooling and child labour laws and then looks at the direct effect of changes in these laws on education and mortality rates using a regression discontinuity approach. Section 4 presents the general econometric framework used for estimating the effect of education on mortality. The results are presented in Section 5, including the first stage results of the effect of the laws on education, the OLS and IV estimates of the effect of education on mortality and the reduced form estimates. Section 6 discusses the results and conclusions are given in Section 7.
2. DATA I use the U.S. censuses of 1960, 1970 and 1980 , which are 1% random samples of the population. 12 The census provides information on age, sex, race, education, and state-of-birth. My samples include all white persons born in the 48 states, 13 that were 14 years of age between 1914 and 1939, with no missing values for completed years of education. 14 I use the censuses to follow "synthetic cohorts". Although I do not observe the same individuals over time (so I cannot observe individual deaths), I do observe the same groups over time, which allows me to estimate group death rates. I aggregate the censuses into groups defined according to their gender, cohort and state-of-birth (descriptive statistics in Table 1 ). Using the 1960, 1970 and 1980 censuses, I can calculate two 10-year death rates for each group: one for 1960 -1970 , and another for 1970 -1980 . For example, the 1960 -1970 death rate for a group is the number of people alive in 1960 (N 60 ) minus the number of people alive in 1970 (N 70 ) divided by the population in 1960 (N 60 ). The average 10-year mortality in my data is about 0·11.
One issue that arises in estimating death rates by groups is measurement error. As Figure 3 shows, because of random sampling the number of deaths will be overestimated about half the time and underestimated half the time for all cohorts. As a result, some estimated death rates are negative. In the data, we observe more negative death rates for younger cohorts and fewer negative death rates for older cohorts (see Figure 4 (a)); this is a pattern we should expect. As we can see in Figure 3 (b), with a zero death rate (no change in the population) two successive samplings of the same population result in a negative death rate half the time. When the death rate increases (as the population ages) the likelihood that the second sample will contain more observations than the first falls, resulting in fewer negative death rates. We also observe fewer negative death rates for states with large population (Figure 4(b) ), which is also to be expected since the sampling error is smaller for larger populations.
12. The data come from the IPUMS 1960 general sample, the 1970 Form 2 State sample (originally 15% state sample), and the 1980 1% Metro sample (originally B sample).
13. Hawaii and Alaska were not then part of the Union. 14. For consistency across censuses, I recoded completed years of education to be a maximum of 18 years instead of 20 in 1980. The negative death rates are not a source of concern for two reasons. First, the estimated death rates result in consistent estimates of the true death rates. 15 Second, average cohort death rates from the censuses are very similar to those obtained from individual data from the NHEFS described below (see Figure 4 (c)).
These graphs suggest there are two issues concerning the death rates. First there is evidence of age heaping: for ages that are multiples of 10, the death rates fall, because individuals tend to over-report their age and chose a multiple of 10 when doing so. Also, unexpectedly, there are
The 1960 and 1970 census are 1/100 random samples of the population, therefore the number of individuals in any given group is always observed with error. Because of this sampling error the death rates for any given group are overestimated 50% of the time and underestimated 50% of the time. However, since the sampling is truly random, the observed death rates are consistent estimates of the true death rates.
If the true death rate is 0 then I observe 50% negative death rates. As cohorts age, the death n/100 n/100 
rate increases (see example above) and the number of negative death rates falls.
FIGURE 3
Calculating death rates with the census. (a) Measurement error in death rates due to sampling. (b) An example for a young cohort: 0 death rate large falls in the death rates for younger cohorts between the 1960 and 1970 census (higher number of negative death rates). This might be due to the relatively few observations per cohort (48 states * 2 genders = 96): the standard deviation around the percentage of negative death rates is quite large (if, for example, one aggregates also by education then the differences are smaller). I will try to address both of these concerns in my estimations. I also use the National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey I Epidemiologic Followup Study, 1992 (hereafter NHEFS). This survey followed 14,407 individuals who were between 25 and 74 years of age when interviewed for the first National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES I) between 1971 and 1974. The NHEFS followed individuals and recorded whether they had died by 1985. The sample is composed of whites 16 that were 14 years of age between 1914 and 1939, who were alive in 1975 and followed successfully, with no missing observations for years of completed education (N = 4554). Table 1 shows the summary statistics for this data.
16. Other researchers have suggested that blacks had significantly different school experiences during the beginning of the century. See Card and Krueger (1992) . Also, Lleras-Muney (2002) suggests that compulsory schooling laws and child labour laws did not affect blacks. 1901 1904 1907 1910 1913 1916 1919 1922 1925 Birth The data on compulsory attendance and child labour laws come from a number of sources. There are 8 years of state-level data (1915, 1918, 1921, 1924, 1929, 1930, 1935 and 1939) on these laws, 17 and some additional information for other years. I imputed missing observations by using the older values. I also collected data on state-level factors that contributed to the growth of secondary education from 1915 to 1939 18 or that could affect mortality. These include state expenditures on education, the number of school buildings per acre, per cent of the population that was living in urban areas, per cent of the white population that was foreign born, per cent of the population that was black, per cent of the population employed in manufacturing, average annual wages in manufacturing per worker, average value of farm property per acre, and number of doctors per capita (see Lleras-Muney, 2002 for information on data sources).
Each individual is matched to the laws and state characteristics that were in place in their state-of-birth when they were 14 years old. I choose this age because it is the lowest common drop-out age across states. This procedure assumes that individuals went to school in their stateof-birth. Inevitably some individuals were mismatched. However, Card and Krueger (1992) show that mobility was low during this period. Also Lleras-Muney (2002) shows that mobility seems to be uncorrelated to these laws and that restricting the sample to those that are still living in their state-of-birth does not change the effect of the laws. 
Background on compulsory attendance and child labour laws
Since their inception in Massachusetts in 1852, compulsory attendance laws have been complex. They specify a minimum and a maximum age between which school attendance is required; a minimum period of attendance; penalties for non-compliance; and the conditions under which individuals could be exempted from attending school, such as the completion of a given grade, mental or physical disability, distance from school, and so on. The most common exemption was for work. Work permits were available even for young children, generally even younger than the minimum drop-out age specified by compulsory education laws. Child labour laws, which extensively regulated the employment of minors, also included several conditions for the granting of such permits and for exemptions. Child labour laws and compulsory attendance laws often were not coordinated. Each stipulated different requirements for leaving school. For example, in 1924 in Pennsylvania, the ages for compulsory attendance were 8-16, but the child labour laws allowed 14 year olds to get work permits and leave school. 20 Continuation school laws, which forced children at work to continue their education on a part-time basis, were the only laws that attempted to bridge this gap. Compulsory attendance laws and child labour laws were in place in all states by 1918, and were modified frequently thereafter.
There is little agreement regarding the effectiveness of these laws. 21 Previous studies (including my own) 22 suggest that only three of the many aspects of these laws had an impact on individual educational attainment: the age at which a child had to enter school (enter age), 17. Acemoglu and Angrist (1999) have gathered similar data. The data for this project were collected independently.
18. The state-level variables were suggested by the work of Goldin (1994) and Goldin and Katz (1997) .
19. I regressed mobility between state-of-birth and state-of-residence in 1960 as a function of education, compulsory education laws and all other covariates used in this paper. The F-statistic of joint significance of the laws has a value of 1·17 (P-value of 0·3151), suggesting the laws cannot explain mobility. Also Lleras-Muney (2002) shows that restricting the sample to those that are still living in their state-of-birth yields estimates of the effect of the laws that are statistically identical to those presented here.
20. During this early period work permits effectively allowed children to leave school. See Woltz (1955) . 21. For a detailed review of these studies see Lleras-Muney (2002) . 22. See Schmidt (1996) , Acemoglu and Angrist (1999) and Lleras-Muney (2002) .
the age at which the child could get a work permit and leave school (work age), and whether or not the state required children with work permits to attend school on a part-time basis (contsch). Following Acemoglu and Angrist (1999) , I combine the age at which a child had to enter school and the age required for a work permit into a single variable, childcom, defined as: childcom = work age − enter age. This variable is the implicit number of years that a child had to attend school, given that the entering age and the work permit age were enforced. It takes the values of 0, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 or 10. The other variable, contsch, takes the value of 1 if continuation school laws were in place. Tabulations describing these laws throughout the period for each state are shown in Appendices A and B. Importantly note that it is not always the case that more years of compulsory schooling were required, although on average states required more schooling towards the end of the period. The period from 1915 to 1939 is when compulsory education laws (hereafter I refer to both compulsory attendance laws and child labour laws as "compulsory education laws") are more likely to have affected many individuals. Secondary schooling was experiencing remarkable growth, especially in the first 40 years of the 20-th century. 23 Also, in the previous period (up to 1915), these laws were perceived as ineffective. 24 But social scientists agree that the laws were enforced by the 1920's 25 and Schmidt's work (1996) -the only study to concentrate on this period-confirms it. Edwards (1978) and Angrist and Krueger (1991) suggest that the laws declined in importance after the 1940's. So the first part of the 20-th century provides the perfect window of opportunity for using the laws as instruments. Finally, from a technical point of view, this period is interesting because states were constantly changing their compulsory education and child labour laws.
Regression discontinuity results
In this section I take a regression discontinuity approach to look at the direct effect of changes in compulsory schooling on mortality rates by comparing the mortality rates of cohorts immediately before and after there was a change in legislation.
The advantage of this approach is that I concentrate on cohorts right before and right after the state changed its legislation. These cohorts are presumably similar. On the other hand the sample is small. Additionally we are not looking at cohorts more than 1-3 years away from changes in legislation even though these cohorts could have been affected by legislation changes. Most importantly, there could still be errors in the exact year when legislation took place in which case this approach possibly underestimates the effects of these laws. Note that this approach assumes that there were no other discontinuous jumps in unobserved characteristics in the year that laws were changed. I look at increases and decreases in years of compulsory schooling separately.
I drop states that did not change their compulsory schooling laws, eliminate changes that were in place only for 1 year, 26 and keep 7 cohorts per change: 3 cohorts before, 3 cohorts after and the cohort of the change. The final sample contains 57 changes in legislation that took place in 36 states, 16 decreases and 41 increases. Figure 5 shows the changes in mortality rates for all states that increased their compulsory schooling laws. In these states we see evidence that compulsory schooling lowered mortality: mortality rates drop for the first cohort affected by 23. Goldin and Katz (1997) show that the percentage of young adults with high school degrees increased from 9% in 1910 to more than 50% in 1940.
24. Many state laws did not even provide enforcement mechanisms, and if they did, there were often insufficient means to enforce them, especially in rural areas. See Ensign (1921) and Katz (1976) .
25. See Katz (1976) . 26. These changes were presumably never enforced-these changes are possibly due to measurement error in the laws. In Appendix B all changes that were dropped are highlighted.
All states
States where many were affected FIGURE 5 Effect of increasing compulsory schooling on mortality rates the law (labelled 0) and it remained low for the 3 cohorts after the law was passed. Due to the imprecision of my death rates and the small sample size, these estimates are not significant. 27 However, they do provide suggestive evidence that compulsory laws lowered mortality.
A potential concern with these results is that states passed laws when they were no longer binding, or alternatively that these laws were passed but not enforced. To address this concern, I restrict attention only to changes that could have affected many. For each increase in compulsory schooling I calculate the number of individuals in the previous cohort "at the margin", as a percentage of the number of individuals that were in compliance with the previous law. So for example, Alabama went from 4 to 6 years of compulsory schooling in 1921. In 1920, 68 individuals were obtaining exactly 4 and 5 years of schooling, and about 425 were obtaining more than 4 years of schooling, so I calculate that 16% of individuals would be affected (see Appendix B). I then drop states for which this percentage is lower than 15, somewhat above the median value in the data. The results are not very sensitive to the cut-off. This further reduces the sample to 15 states and 21 increases in compulsory schooling. Figure 5 shows the effect of increases in compulsory schooling on mortality rates for this restricted sample. Again we see that even though the sample is smaller (and differences are not significant), there is an unusually high decrease in mortality rates for the first cohort affected by the legislative change. This effect is, as expected, larger than the effect for the full sample. We also see that mortality remains low for subsequent cohorts.
The results for decreases in compulsory schooling are not shown. They yielded insignificant and unstable effects depending on the sample. There are several reasons why we cannot estimate the effect of decreases in compulsory schooling on mortality. First notice that there are only 16 downward changes in the law in my data. Notice that in seven of those cases (California 1918 , Florida 1918 , Georgia 1918 , North Carolina 1918 , Rhode Island 1918 , Utah 1918 and Washington 1918 these changes were in place only for 2/3 years before the law changed again to increase the number of compulsory schooling years. Also for Tennessee and Oregon 1939, we do not observe any cohorts after the change in the law. So indeed there are only seven cases when the downward changes lasted more than 3 years and for which we 27. Results are shown in Appendix C.
States where many were affected FIGURE 6 Effect of increasing compulsory schooling on education observed cohorts before and after. Aside from the statistical reasons, it is possible that once compulsory schooling has been set at some given level, that level becomes the norm and so subsequent decreases might not have any effect at all. Figure 6 shows the effect of increases in compulsory schooling on educational attainment, for both the entire and restricted samples. We observe that education increased in the year the legislation changed for both samples, although again these changes are not statistically significant. Interestingly states where the laws appear binding using my measure, had higher mortality rates and lower educational attainment than other states.
These results suggest that compulsory laws had an effect on adult mortality and education, and they are consistent with the hypothesis that education affects health. So I proceed to estimate these effects more precisely in the following sections.
ESTIMATING THE EFFECT OF EDUCATION ON MORTALITY

Econometric model
The econometric model for the relationship between education and health can be written as
where H i is individual i's health stock, E is his education level, X is a vector of individual characteristics that affect health, such as smoking, and genetic factors. The purpose of this paper is to determine only whether or not education affects health (i.e. π = 0?). Notice, however, that OLS estimates of this equation can be biased. One reason is because of measurement error in education, although there is evidence that measurement error is relatively small. For example, Angrist and Krueger (1999) find that "measurement error can be expected to reduce the return to a year of education by about 10% (assuming there are no other covariates)". More importantly there could be omitted variable bias. For example an individual's health during childhood can be correlated with his adult health and may also affect his educational attainment. Alternatively, ability or discount rates can be correlated with both education and health. Lastly it could be the case that improved health increases investments in education. For example, a longer life expectancy induces individuals to stay in school longer (since a longer life expectancy increases the time period over which there will be returns to investments in education, see Ben-Porath (1967) ).
OLS estimation using mortality as the health outcome
Assuming that the model is properly specified (i.e. the previously mentioned endogeneity concerns are absent) then we can estimate the equation of interest by OLS once we specify the appropriate health outcome. Although health is unobserved, mortality is observable. Following Grossman's model of health (reviewed in his 1999 paper), death occurs when the stock of health falls below a certain threshold. In a less deterministic model, H i is proportional to the underlying probability (index) of being alive, and death is the observed result. This is the usual limiteddependent variable set-up. This mortality equation can be estimated at the individual level using the NHEFS but not the census. If individuals could be followed from the 1960 census to the 1970 census (or from 1970 to 1980), then (based on the previous discussion) the following individual linear probability model could be estimated:
where D itcs is equal to 1 if the individual i (belonging to cohort c and born in state s) is deceased at time t. E ics is i's education (measured by completed years of education), X are other timeinvariant individual characteristics such as gender, W cs is a set of characteristics of individual i's state-of-birth at age 14, γ c is a set of cohort dummies, α s is a set of state-of-birth dummies, b is an intercept, and ε is the error term. Using the census, individuals cannot be tracked over time, but I can track groups that are constant over time, and calculate their death rates by aggregating the data. I aggregate by gender, cohort, and state-of-birth. This aggregation level uses all of the available individual characteristics that are time invariant (except for education), and therefore it maximizes the number of observations in the aggregate data. The aggregate model is derived from the individual model by averaging over individuals in a given gender/cohort/state-of-birth group as follows:
where D gtcs represents the proportion of individuals that died at time t in a given group or the death rate for that group, and X gcs represents the average characteristics of that group (for example, the percentage of females in the group). 28 Notice that omitted variable bias at the individual level will be carried over to the aggregate level. I use a linear probability model for the estimation. The existence of negative death rates makes it impossible to use a (more desirable) non-linear model such as a Logit or Probit. However, since the dependent variable (the death rate) is not censored below by 0, the linear probability assumption is less problematic in this case than in general. In this linear model the error term is heteroscedastic however. A standard estimation procedure 29 in this case is to run weighted least squares, where the weights are constructed using the observed probabilities. Again, due to random sampling and the error it generates, these observed probabilities can be negative, so this estimation is not possible. In order to address the heteroscedasticity problem I estimate the equation by GLS (weighted least squares) using the number of individuals in the group as weights. To correct for further heteroscedasticity, I use White's robust estimator.
28. Including a dummy for gender. 29. See Green (1997, p. 895) and Maddala (1997, p. 29) .
IV estimates
4.3.1. Efficient Wald estimates. One obvious solution to correct for the bias in the GLS coefficient is to use instrumental variables (IV). Given that many instruments are available, two stage least squares (2SLS) would be the preferred estimation method. At the individual level, the 2SLS model is
where D is equal to one if the individual is deceased at time t. E is i's education (measured by completed years of education), X are other individual characteristics (including gender), W cs is a set of characteristics of individual i's state-of-birth at age 14, γ c is a set of cohort dummies, α s is a set of state-of-birth dummies, b is an intercept, and ε is the error term. CL is the set of compulsory education laws that serve as instruments to identify the education equation. This model can be estimated using the individual NHEFS data but not with the census.
Since the census data can be used only as grouped data, the Wald estimator is an alternative estimator for the effect of education. Angrist (1991) showed that the Wald estimator for grouped data is efficient and in fact equivalent to 2SLS using individual level data. In the case of many explanatory variables the efficient Wald estimator is found by GLS estimation of the following equation:
where D crl is the death rate for individuals born in cohort c in region r under compulsory law l, and E csl is the average education of individuals born in cohort c in region r under compulsory law l. The weights are given by the population in each group. In other words, Wald is estimated by grouping the data by gender/cohort/region-of-birth and compulsory education law. This procedure is equivalent to 2SLS at the individual level, where gender, cohort dummies and region dummies serve as their own instruments (since they are exogenous), and compulsory education laws serve as instruments for education, the endogenous variable. The estimates are referred to as the efficient Wald estimates. Note that because compulsory education laws are defined at the state-of-birth and cohort level, I cannot control for both state-of-birth and cohort when using this estimator. This is a drawback of the Wald estimator, especially if one thinks that state-of-birth and the laws are correlated. In order to alleviate this problem, I control instead for region-of-birth. But region-ofbirth may not be a good proxy for state-of-birth. Furthermore, other state-of-birth characteristics (W cs ) cannot be included in this specification.
4.3.2. Two-stage least squares with aggregate data. Alternatively, I can estimate the 2SLS model at the data that has been aggregated at the state-of-birth/cohort and gender level. Estimation at the aggregate level results in less efficient estimates (see Green, 1997, pp. 433-434) but all the covariates (especially state-of-birth) can be included. Using the aggregate data 2SLS is obtained by estimating the following model:
where now D t gcs is the proportion of individuals who died in a given gender/cohort and state-ofbirth, E gcs is the average education of that group and X gcs are other average characteristics. Again, the weights are given by the number of observations in each cell, and the excluded instruments from the mortality equation are the compulsory education dummies, C L cs . The first stage (estimation of E gcs ) will be shown as well in the results section.
4.3.3. Mixed two-stage least squares estimation. The census allows me to estimate the first stage using individual data. The intuition behind Mixed-2SLS is that it might be possible to take advantage of this fact and gain efficiency (relative to the previous 2SLS) by estimating the first stage at the individual level (as done in the previous section) and then aggregating the data by gender/cohort/state-of-birth (see Dhrymes and Lleras-Muney, 2001 ). 30 Mixed-2SLS is obtained by estimating the following equation through weighted least squares:
Again D gcs represents the proportion of individuals who died in a given gender/cohort and state-of-birth group, X gcs represents the average characteristics of the group, but now I include E gcs , the average predicted education for that group from the first stage. 31 The weights are given by the number of observations in each cell. The excluded instruments from the mortality equation are the compulsory education dummies. The only difference between standard 2SLS with aggregated data and Mixed-2SLS is in the predicted education term. 2SLS uses predicted average education whereas Mixed-2SLS uses average predicted education.
More formally, let H be the matrix that transforms the data into group means and weights each group mean by the number of individuals in the group. X contains all the same variables as in the GLS estimation, but with education replaced by the predicted level of education from the first stage regression X = E | X | γ c | α s . Then the estimator β Mixed can be expressed as
This procedure also results in consistent estimates. As usual the variance-covariance matrix needs to be corrected. 32
RESULTS
The effect of the laws on educational attainment
Before presenting the IV results, this section estimates the first stage, showing that the laws are good predictors of educational attainment both at the individual and aggregate level. I also provide additional evidence here that the laws are good instruments. These results will then be used in the two-stage (IV) estimations.
As preliminary evidence of the effect of these laws on education, I graph the average education by childcom for the entire sample ( Figure 7 ) and by cohort, for every fifth cohort in the data (Figure 8 ). Additionally recall that Figure 6 shows average education for the cohorts before and after laws were increased. These graphs show that average education is higher for those in states where more education was compulsory, and higher within states, after compulsory laws increased. In order to add further controls, I turn now to regression analysis. Pooling individual data from the 1960 and 1970 census, I estimate the following equation: Average education level by compulsory education for selected cohorts
The dependent variable is the number of years of completed education for individual i of cohort c born in state s. CL is a set of dummies for compulsory education laws in place in state s when the individual was 14, X ics are individual characteristics such as gender and region of current residence, W cs is a set of characteristics of individual i's state-of-birth at age 14 (such as manufacturing wages, expenditures in education, per capita doctors, etc.), γ c are cohort dummies, α s are state-of-birth dummies. The regression also includes interactions between region-of-birth and cohort, an intercept (b) and a dummy for 1970. I also estimate the model by aggregating the data at the state-of-birth/cohort and gender level. Table 2 shows the results. The first column estimates the relationship at the individual level including only state effects, cohort effects, a female dummy, and a set of dummies for the laws. The coefficients are fairly robust to the addition of other controls (compare columns 1 and 2 of Table 2) . 33 The third column shows the results from estimating the equation using the data aggregated at the state-of-birth, cohort and gender level. The estimations show that the laws increased the educational attainment of individuals. As expected, all dummies for the laws are positive and significant and they generally increase as the number of compulsory years increases. I reject the null hypothesis that all the coefficients on the dummies are identical (Fstatistic = 8·11, P-value 0·0000). However, it is not always the case that education increases with more demanding laws, for example in the aggregate estimation, the coefficient on 6 years of compulsory schooling is smaller than that for 5 years, and the coefficient for 10 years is smaller than that for 9 years. This is unexpected, but it is most likely due to the fact that individuals in the sample are very unequally distributed across categories: only about 3% of individuals are in categories 0, 4 and 5; 25% are in category 6, 56% in category 7, and about 15% are in categories 8, 9 and 10. If I re-estimate the model using only these broader categories (as in Acemoglu and Angrist, 1999) , then the coefficients are monotonically increasing as expected. 34 It is also important to remember that these laws were not necessarily binding for many individuals, as we discussed in previous sections. Therefore the estimated effect for any one category is the average of positive effects for those individuals in states where the laws were binding, a zero effect for states where it was not.
Additional estimations suggest that these results are not due to any one level of compulsory schooling: dropping all observations in any one category (for example dropping all individuals for whom there was no required years of school, i.e. childcom = 0) does not diminish the explanatory power of the other categories. 35 Because the individual regressions only control for gender and no other individual-level covariates the R-squared in these regressions is low. By contrast the R-squared for the aggregate regression is quite high since the state level covariates can explain much of the between state variation.
Columns 4 and 5 suggest that the overall implied increase in educational attainment due to childcom is around 4·8% of a year. This estimate is similar to those reported by Eisenberg (1988) , Angrist and Krueger (1991) and Acemoglu and Angrist (1999) . Also, the continuation school dummy is positive. 36 The last column reports the results using aggregate data and restricting the sample only to those states where laws were binding, and includes only three cohorts before and three cohorts after the increase in the law, so this regression uses the same sample that was used to create the graphs in Section 2. The effect for this restricted sample is also significant but somewhat smaller (0·035), although standard errors are large.
Other coefficients are also positive and statistically significant in both individual and aggregate estimations. The results are not surprising for per cent urban since cities had more schools. The coefficient on per capita number of doctors might reflect the fact that healthier children obtain more schooling, but it could also be proxying for urbanicity: even though I control for per cent urban this variable is only available in decennial censuses and has been interpolated, whereas number of doctors exists every 2 years. Alternatively it could also proxy for wealth. Unexpectedly, per cent black is positive and significant. This could reflect the fact that blacks 33. Inclusion of other variables, such as income, immigrant status of parents, has no impact on them. Also, regressions by region-of-birth or by gender yield similar results. See Lleras-Muney (2002) for these results.
34. Relative to 5 or fewer years of compulsory schooling, the estimated coefficients (and standard errors) on the categories are as follows:
6 years 0·058 (0·040); 7 years 0·155 (0·042); 8 years or more 0·182 (0·046). 35. The F-statistics of the joint significance of the laws are always significant no matter which categories are dropped from the sample. Results available upon request.
36. Continuation school is not significant in this sample, but previous work (see Lleras-Muney, 2002) showed that this law affected white males and individuals born in the north and south of the U.S. Therefore I include it. were moving to areas where whites obtain higher levels of schooling, but it is difficult to be conclusive on this point. Before turning to the effect of education on mortality, I present evidence that the laws are good instruments. At the bottom of Table 2 , I report the F-test of joint significance of the laws; it shows that the laws are always jointly significant at the 5% level for both specifications. Additionally the F-statistic is greater than 5 (or very close to), which suggests that the instruments are strong given the number of instruments used. I also report the partial R-squared coefficient, another measure of the instruments' strength. 37 It has values of either 0·0002 or 0·0119, which compare favourably to those reported by Bound et al. (1995) .
It is also worth pointing out that the changes in the laws that took place during this period appear to have been exogenous to individuals. Although different states might have had different tastes for education, the regressions here include a very large set of controls (cohort dummies, state-of-birth dummies and region-of-birth * cohort interactions are included) which should capture this effect. Also note that the addition of controls (compare columns 1 and 2 of Table 2 ) has little effect on the coefficients of the laws, suggesting that any excluded state-ofbirth/cohort level variables are not correlated with the laws. Furthermore, Lleras-Muney (2002) presents evidence consistent with exogenous laws: her results suggest that the laws impacted only the lower end of the distribution of education. She rejects the hypothesis that changes in the laws during this period resulted from (rather than caused) increases in education. 38 A final concern is that the laws must affect individual health only through their effect on education. There is no evidence that the laws included any clauses or restrictions that would have affected health independently. For example, there were no lunch programmes provided as part of school attendance. Also the states that led in education during this period (the prairie states) 39 were not the same states that led in health (north-eastern states). 40 But again, the controls included here are meant to rule out this possibility. Finally, exogeneity tests are performed in the IV estimation (see the next section).
Overall the results show that the laws did have an impact on educational achievement, and that their predictive power is large, so they can be used as instruments. Therefore I turn now to the question of the effect of education on mortality.
Least squares estimates of the effect of education on mortality
Although we have good reason to believe that GLS produces biased estimates, I report them here as the benchmark for comparison with the IV results. Using the census, I estimate the GLS model described above. The results are in the first column of Table 3 . The estimated coefficient of the effect of education on the death rate is about −0·017. The coefficient is highly significant and is robust to the inclusion of more controls. 41 The validity of the aggregation procedure rests on the assumption that the aggregate data can be understood as coming from unobserved individual data. It is important that this intuition 37. Bound et al. (1995) suggest that: 1-the F-statistic on the excluded instruments in the first stage should be statistically significant and large (Staiger and Stock (1997) further suggest that a value of less than 5 could signal weak instruments. This is a rule of thumb); 2-the partial R-square should be high.
38. The test, inspired by Landes and Solomon (1972) , consists of matching individuals to the laws in place in their state-of-birth when they were 17, 18 and up to 26 years of age, when these laws should no longer have affected them.
39. See Goldin and Katz (1997) . 40. Starr's (1982) book provides anecdotal evidence that the northern states lead in a variety of health aspects. My own data support this conclusion. For example, the north had the highest number of doctors per capita throughout the period. And the number of doctors per capita in the north did not decline from 1915 to 1939 but did decline in the rest of the country. The north also had the highest declines in infant mortality rates during this period. (Results available upon request.) 41. Results available upon request. All regressions include 24 cohort dummies, 47 state-of-birth dummies, region-of-birth * cohort, and an intercept. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the state-of-birth and cohort level. The census regressions also include a dummy for the 1970 census. Table 3 .
Comparing the results from LS regressions from the census with results from the NHEFS shows that the census data give estimates of the effect of education that are very similar to those obtained using the NHEFS aggregated data, which in turn are similar to those obtained at the individual level, using either LS or probit estimations. These results suggest that sampling (and the measurement error it generates) does not significantly affect the estimates for education, that there is no aggregation bias and that the linear model is a good approximation of the education-death rate relationship. The comparison is also useful in terms of interpretation: a −0·011 coefficient for education means that increasing the education of a given cell by 1 year lowers its death rate by 1·1 percentage points. This coefficient also implies that increasing an individual's education by 1 year will lower his probability of dying between 1960 and 1970 (or between 1970 and 1980) by 1·2 percentage points. This latter interpretation is more intuitive and useful. Note again that the OLS effect is quite large: at the mean, this result implies that a 10% increase in education lowers mortality by about 11%, therefore an elasticity of about −1.
The only other significant coefficient in these equations is the effect of the number of school buildings per square mile which increases mortality (this is also the case in the following IV estimations). It is unclear why this would be the case unless again this variable captures urbanization.
IV estimates of the effect of education on mortality
The first column in Table 4 presents the 2SLS results using the NHEFS. This estimation is done at the individual level and using standard 2SLS. The estimate is positive (the effect of education is about −0·017) but not significant: because this sample is small, the first stage estimation 42 is poor. Nonetheless, although the standard errors are high, the estimates from this sample are also larger than the GLS estimates obtained from the same data (−0·011).
The second column shows the results from the Wald estimation. The Wald estimate of the effect of education is about −0·037 and significant at the 5% level. The third column presents the results of 2SLS estimation using aggregated data at the gender/state-of-birth and cohort level. The effect of education is about −0·051 and significant at the 5% level. The Mixed-2SLS results (last column) show that the coefficient on education is approximately −0·061 and is significant at the 5% level. Overall the results suggest that increasing education by 1 additional year lowers the 10-year death rate by at least 3·6 percentage points. 43 For the last two estimators I perform a test of overidentifying restrictions. The χ 2 statistic for the aggregate 2SLS model is 2·84 and 1·49 for the Mixed-2SLS model. This statistic tests the hypothesis that the model is well specified. It is calculated as the sample size times the R 2 from a regression of the residuals from the second stage on all exogenous variables, including the instruments. In both cases the overidentifying restrictions are not rejected at a 5% level (critical value 14·06). This test in conjunction with earlier results from the first stage suggests that compulsory education laws are legitimate instruments.
Additional checks are presented in Table 5 . As a last attempt to address the potential endogeneity of the laws, I repeat the estimations above using a larger set of instruments that include compulsory attendance and the interactions of quarter of birth and the laws (quarter of birth is not used as an instrument, it is included in both first and second stages). Presumably these individual-level instruments will increase the efficiency of the estimates, and they are perhaps less likely to be endogenous. 44 The results (Panel A) are identical to those presented above. The results are also very similar if only the interactions between the laws and quarter of birth are 42. Results available upon request. Only two of the dummies for compulsory education laws were significant at the 10% level, and the set of dummies was jointly insignificant.
43. Estimates by region are comparable in size to those presented here except that they are generally not significant. 44. Note however that the use of these instruments might be questionable (see papers in footnote 10). Also LlerasMuney (2002) shows, for example, that the laws affected whites but not blacks. However, quarter of birth does appear to affect blacks' educational attainment. This again raises the issue of whether quarter of birth has an independent effect on education unrelated to compulsory attendance laws. 
Note: All coefficients come from separate estimations that contain the same controls as in previous tables. * Significant at 10%; * * significant at 5%.
females than for males, confirming the findings in the literature that the effect of education is larger for males. These results also suggest that World Wars I and II did not result in significant selection bias for men. Panels C and D address concerns related to the mortality data. Panel C shows the results excluding ages 40, 50 and 60 since the data showed evidence of age heaping. This is a potential problem if age heaping is correlated with education. Panel D includes interactions between cohort dummies and the 1970 census dummy. The results are unaffected by these modifications.
Finally in Panel E I repeat the estimations by region of birth. Except for the North where the 2SLS is 0, these are quantitatively similar to all the results presented before. So the previous estimates are not purely based on differences between regions.
Reduced form results
Finally Table 6 presents the results from the reduced form equations, i.e. the direct effect of the laws on mortality. These results are the numerical counterparts of the graphs presented in Section 3, except that I use the number of years of compulsory school rather than dummies for the cohorts before and after. By regressing mortality rates on compulsory schooling laws, state, and cohort dummies, and additional state and time varying controls, we estimate the effect of increasing compulsory schooling by one more year within states over time. This estimate is more informative than an estimate of the average effect of any increase in the law (what the regression discontinuity estimates), since laws did not always change by 1 year. All regressions include an intercept. Regressions also include dummies for cohorts before the change in the law.
Regressions are weighted by the number of observations in the original cell. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the state-of-birth and cohort. Census data have been aggregated at the census/gender/cohort/state-of-birth level. See the text for an explanation of how the sample was selected. * Significant at 10%; * * significant at 5%.
The first two columns present results using the entire census sample, the second column adds more controls. Both coefficients are significant and they imply that one more year of compulsory schooling decreases mortality by 0·003 or about 3% at the mean. In the next two columns I drop states without changes in compulsory schooling throughout the period. The effect of compulsory schooling remains significant and it is identical to the previous estimates. Finally in the last column I present results using the restricted sample that keeps only states where laws were binding and uses only 3 cohorts before and after the change in compulsory school. Although insignificant, the coefficients are qualitatively very similar to those in columns 1-4.
These results are consistent with previous estimations: if the effect of childcom on education is about 5%, and the effect of education on mortality is about 6%, then the direct effect of the laws on mortality should be about 0·3%, which is approximately what the reduced form results in Table 6 show.
DISCUSSION
The previous sections presented different estimates of the effect of education on mortality. Three different estimators, using two different data-sets and three different levels of aggregation, were used. Although each estimate has weaknesses, all estimates point to the same conclusion: the effect of education is causal and in fact larger than OLS suggests. Also note that there is a significant direct effect of compulsory schooling laws on mortality during adulthood. Given this variety of estimates, this result is very robust. The result is surprising for two reasons. The first is that the IV estimates are larger than the LS estimates. The second is that the effect of education is quite large. In this section I discuss these two issues.
6.0.1. Larger IV estimates. In all the IV estimations presented here, the effect of education is much larger than the LS estimates suggest. The Mixed-2SLS estimates suggest the effect is as large as −0·058, whereas Wald estimates imply a coefficient of about −0·036. At first, this could seem to be a surprising result: the a priori expectation was that LS estimates would be too large. However, there are two important points to note.
First note that the standard errors in the IV estimates are large. Even though the IV estimates are significantly different from 0, it is unclear whether they are statistically different from the OLS estimates. To test whether the IV and OLS estimates are different, one can perform a Durbin-Wu-Hausman test. The F-statistic for this test is 0·05 (P-value 0·82). Therefore I cannot reject the null hypothesis that OLS and IV are the same.
Note that an implication of this test is that education is in fact exogenous, since it suggests that the IV estimates are no different from the OLS estimates in a statistical sense. From this test, I conclude that education appears to have a large causal effect on mortality. The larger IV estimates are therefore of no particular concern.
However, if one still thought that education was endogenous, then the most plausible explanation for the difference between the IV and the OLS estimates in this case is related to the choice of instrument. 46 Under the assumption that different individuals face different returns to education due to unobserved characteristics, IV estimates reflect the marginal rate of return of the group affected by the instrument (Angrist, Imbens and Rubin, 1996) . In this case IV capture the returns to those affected by the compulsory schooling laws. If I estimate a regression of mortality as a function of education and education squared, where both are instrumented with compulsory schooling laws, I do indeed find some evidence that the relationship is convex. However I do not place too much weight on these results given that (a) under the hypothesis that education is endogenous, the instruments can only identify a non-linear relation for those affected by the laws, rather than for the population at large, and (b) education does not appear to be endogenous! 6.0.2. What is the effect of education on health? The second issue is that the effect of education is quite large, and it is important to understand why. I categorize the potential effects of education into two categories: direct and indirect effects.
First note that if the effect of compulsory schooling was to remove kids from unhealthy jobs and bring them to the classroom, then the effect of education cannot be distinguished from the effect of not working.
46. Another explanation is that the omitted variable bias is smaller than the bias that results from measurement error in education (Card, 1995) . The health literature has not been concerned with this potential problem although there is evidence of measurement error in education. If the measurement error is random, then the IV estimate will be larger than the OLS estimate. Larger IV returns can also be explained if there exist health externalities from education for example if average education affects individual health. However, note that the fact that individual and aggregate estimations using the NHEFS result in similar effects for education suggests that externalities are not the main reason for larger IV.
Among the direct effects, education provides individuals with critical thinking skills that are useful in the production of health (Grossman's hypothesis). There is some evidence to this effect. For example, Goldman and Smith (2001) find that the more educated are more likely to comply with treatments for diabetes and Aids. Goldman and Lakdawalla (2001) suggest that the more educated are better able to manage chronic conditions. These two papers suggest that education matters when treatments are complex and there is scope for learning by doing. These mechanisms have also been documented by Rosenzweig and Schultz (1989) , who compared success rates of different contraception methods for women with different levels of education: they find that success rates are identical for all women for "easy" methods such as the pill, but the rhythm method is only effective for educated women.
If this is the case, then the interaction of education with a variety of factors might be relevant. For example, although access to information alone cannot explain health differences across education groups (Kenkel, 1991) , information available to the more educated will result in greater benefits for them if they can use the information better. For example, when analysing the effects of the 1964 Surgeon General Report, Meara (2001) concluded that "the response to knowledge plays a more important role than knowledge itself in creating differential health behaviour".
Another possibility is that the more educated might be more likely to adopt and use new medical technologies. 47 Since the rate of medical innovation dramatically increased in the last century, especially for particular diseases such as heart disease (Cutler, McClellan and Newhouse, 1998) , it is reasonable to think that the more educated were able to capture very high returns during this period. Lleras-Muney and Lichtenberg (2002) , for example, show that the more educated are more likely to use newer drugs.
There are a few indirect mechanisms through which education might affect health which are also consistent with the results reported in this paper.
Education gives you access to a higher income and different types of jobs, both of which affect health. For example, only high school graduates in the first half of the century had access to white collar jobs, which provided healthier work environments than manufacturing or agriculture. Controlling for income (or occupation) does not change the results in this paper. 48 But, since income is endogenous, it is not possible (given that I have no instruments for income) to distinguish the direct effect of education on health from its indirect effect through income. The same is true for occupation. However, standard results suggest that the returns to education are about 10% and that the elasticity of mortality with respect to income is about −0·3. 49 If the sole effect of education is through income, one more year of education should decrease mortality by 0·003 (for average mortality of 0·11), 50 which is a much smaller effect than what was estimated here. With respect to occupation, I simply note here that since the effect of education is similar 47 . See Nelson and Phelps (1966) . 48. Results available upon request. 49. Deaton and Paxson (1999) . 50. The calculation is performed as follows: Deaton and Paxson (1999) estimate that
Studies in labour have found that log(inc) = 0·1ed so by replacing I find that log d 1 − d = −0·03ed the marginal effect is given by ∂d ∂ed = −0·03d(1 − d). Evaluated at the mean (i.e. for d = 0·11) this effect is about −0·003.
for men and women, it would appear that occupation is not the only channel through which education affects health.
Finally note that the cognitive psychology literature has documented that lack of education is correlated with stress, depression and hostility, all of which have been shown to adversely affect health (Adler et al., 1994) .
The results in this paper do not imply that time preferences do not affect health and education choices nor that there is no reverse causality from health to education. They simply show that there is a causal effect of education on health, and that this effect is not due to time preferences. However, as Becker and Mulligan (1997) argue, education could lower the discount rate, making people more patient. This is yet another indirect mechanism that could explain my results.
CONCLUSION
This paper has shown that there is a large causal effect of education on mortality. While GLS estimates suggest that an additional year of education lowers the probability of dying in the next 10 years by approximately 1·3 percentage points, my results from the IV estimation show that the effect is perhaps much larger: at least 3·6 percentage points. Moreover there is a direct effect of compulsory schooling laws on mortality during adulthood: one more year of compulsory schooling decreased mortality after age 35 by about 3%.
However, it is worth noting that the OLS and the IV estimates are not statistically different. So, contrary to expectations, I find no evidence that education is endogenous in the mortality equation.
To better understand the impact of education, I calculate how this effect translates into life expectancy gains. I find that in 1960, one more year of education increased life expectancy at age 35 by as much as 1·7 years (using the OLS estimate). This is a very large increase.
A few notes of caution on how to interpret these results for public policy purposes are necessary. First, in order to make policy recommendations, we need to know more about the specific mechanisms by which education affects health. This paper analyses the effects of increasing education from relatively low initial levels. It is unclear what the effects would be at higher initial levels of education. The average education level for white Americans born in 1901 was at most 8·87 years. 51 Today many developing countries, including most Latin American countries, have average levels of education that are similar. This paper implies that more aggressive education policies could dramatically increase adult longevity in such countries. But cost benefit analysis of such policies is extremely complex, since, for example, we do not know what the cost of increasing education would be, or its effectiveness. Questions such as these are beyond the scope of this paper. But the results presented here suggest that the benefits of education are large enough that we need to consider education policies more seriously as a means to increase health, especially in the light of the fact that other factors, such as expenditures on health, have not been proven to be very effective.
This evidence that education increases life expectancy implies that the returns to education, measured only in terms of earnings increases, substantially underestimate the true returns to education. In view of the large magnitude of the effect of education on health, it is clear that more attention needs to be devoted to the pathways of influence. Existing models of the relationship between education and health are very imprecise about the mechanisms through which education operates on health.
APPENDIX A
Years of compulsory schooling Highlighted states are states where laws were unlikely to be effective because changes were in place only for a year. Lines in bold correspond to years when the years of compulsory schooling declined. Robust t statistics in parentheses.
APPENDIX C. REGRESSION DISCONTINUITY RESULTS
(1) See text for definition of this sample. * Significant at 5%; * * significant at 1%.
